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Divergent Opinions and the 
Performance of Value Stocks 
John A. Doukas, Chansog (Francis) Kim, and Christos Pantzalis
Divergence of opinions among investors, manifested in the dispersion of analysts’ earnings
forecasts, may play an important role in asset pricing. This article reports tests of whether
disagreement can explain the cross-sectional return difference between value and growth (or
“glamour”) stocks in the U.S. market over the 1983–2001 period. Consistent with the theoretical
proposition that stocks subject to greater investor disagreement earn higher returns, the tests found
value stocks to be exposed to greater investor disagreement than growth stocks. This finding
suggests that the return advantage of value strategies is a reward for the greater disagreement about
their future growth in earnings. Alternative multifactor asset-pricing tests supported the
proposition that investor disagreement plays an important role in explaining the superior return
of value stocks.
nvestment strategies that call for the purchase
(sale) of stocks with low (high) prices relative
to dividends, earnings, book value, or other
measures of value have been popular in the
U.S. market since Graham and Dodd (1934). Nev-
ertheless, the fact that value stocks (those with high
book-to-market ratios) earn higher returns than
growth (or “glamour”) stocks (those with low
book-to-market ratios) remains a puzzle in asset
pricing. The exact interpretation of this “value pre-
mium” is one of the issues in the ongoing debate
between those who advocate rational asset pricing
and proponents of behavioral finance. 
Supporters of the rational explanation (e.g.,
Fama and French 1993) argue that the value pre-
mium is compensation for bearing risk; value stocks
are fundamentally riskier. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1994) claimed, however, that value stocks
produce superior returns because investors consis-
tently overestimate the future earnings of growth
stocks relative to value stocks.1 The essence of this
argument is that investors, tying their expectations
of future growth in earnings to past bad (or good)
earnings, are excessively pessimistic (optimistic)
about value (growth) stocks. That is, investors make
systematic errors in predicting future growth in
earnings of value stocks and their pessimism about
the future for value stocks is the cause of the supe-
rior performance of value stocks relative to growth
stocks. Subsequent studies that provided evidence
in favor of this behavioral explanation of the value
premium include La Porta (1996) and La Porta,
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997). (The non-
risk-based explanation is also known as the “extrap-
olation” or “errors-in-expectations” explanation.)
Recently, Doukas, Kim, and Pantzalis (2002),
using U.S. analyst earnings forecasts as a proxy for
the market’s expectations of future earnings, pro-
vided evidence against the errors-in-expectations
view. Therefore, the abnormal return of value stocks
on earnings announcement days found by La Porta
et al. must be caused by some mechanism other than
the surprise in the level of earnings.2 We suggest
that disagreement among investors is such a mech-
anism and focus our article on this possibility.
Proponents of the rational explanation of the
value premium argue that value stocks are funda-
mentally riskier than growth stocks, which implies
that the higher average returns of stocks with high
book-to-market ratios reflect compensation for
risk. These proponents reject differences of opinion
as a possible source of risk. 
John A. Doukas is professor of finance and Eminent
Scholar at the Graduate School of Business, Old Domin-
ion University, Norfolk, Virginia. Chansog (Francis) Kim
is associate professor of accounting at the City University
of Hong Kong. Christos Pantzalis is associate professor of
finance at the University of South Florida, Tampa.
Editor’s Note: This research was conducted when John
Doukas was a visiting professor at the Stern School of
Business, New York University.
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Disagreement among investors is widely recog-
nized, however, as a potential determinant of asset
prices.3 In a standard capital asset pricing model
(CAPM) framework, Williams (1977) introduced
heterogeneous beliefs about future stock payoffs
among investors and found a positive association
between future stock returns and differences of
opinion.4 In this framework, not all investors pos-
sess completely accurate probability beliefs; hetero-
geneous expectations among investors matter in
asset pricing because the opportunity set is partially
unknown.5 Thus, the degree of difficulty investors
face in accurately assessing the probability distribu-
tion of stock return payoffs should have important
pricing implications.6 Specifically, when investors
are uncertain about the true probability structure of
stock return payoffs, they tend to hold different sub-
jective opinions about the future payoffs. When the
future prospects of stocks are highly uncertain and
beliefs diverge, investors will demand high rates of
return in order to invest.7 
In an alternative framework, higher returns for
stocks exposed to greater disagreement among
investors arise because in imperfect capital mar-
kets, capital market equilibrium requires the simul-
taneous determination of asset prices and of the
identity of investors (that is, investors’ opinions)
trading in each asset.8 Dispersion of opinion, then,
potentially represents a unique source of risk, and
its impact on prices should be compounded by the
degree of disagreement.
To examine whether the superior performance
of value stocks is associated with investors’ dis-
agreement about future payoffs, we used the dis-
persion in analysts’ earnings forecasts as a proxy
for investors’ heterogeneous beliefs. We hypothe-
sized that value (growth) stocks have greater
(lower) exposure to dispersion in analysts’ fore-
casts and thus should earn a higher (lower) return.
Sample Selection
We used information on analysts’ forecasts from
I/B/E/S files—the U.S. Summary History and
Detail History datasets. The Summary History File
contains the summary statistics on analyst fore-
casts, which I/B/E/S calculates on the basis of all
outstanding forecasts as of the third Thursday of
each month. The Detail History File contains indi-
vidual analysts’ forecasts organized by the date on
which the forecast was issued. Each record also
contains a revision date (i.e., the date on which the
forecast was last confirmed as recent).9 We used
(1) analysts’ forecasts issued in June and (2) ana-
lysts’ forecasts issued in May or April and last
confirmed as recent in June. For example, if the
forecast was made in April or May and was last
confirmed as recent in June, we used it in our
computation of averages and standard deviations
for June. If an analyst made more than one forecast
in a given period, we used only the last forecast in
our calculations.
To be included in the study, each stock had to
be covered by at least two analysts because we
defined dispersion as the standard deviation of
earnings forecasts scaled by the stock price at the
beginning of the year. All forecasts for diluted EPS
were converted into primary EPS by using adjust-
ing factors listed in the I/B/E/S database.
The return data are from the CRSP Monthly
Stocks Combined File, which includes NYSE,
Amex, and NASDAQ stocks. We used book equity
for the fiscal year-end, for which book values came
from Compustat. For the company size data, we
retrieved the market value of equity as of the end
of June of each year from CRSP. 
We followed the Fama and French (1993, 1996)
procedure in constructing portfolios based on book
value to market value (BV/MV) and size. Annual
portfolios based on dispersion of analyst forecast
rankings were constructed by using the informa-
tion from I/B/E/S as indicated previously.
Reported portfolio returns are average monthly
equal-weighted portfolio returns computed for the
annual period starting in the beginning of July of
year t and ending at the end of June of year t + 1. 
The study covers the period June 1983
through December 2001. The starting point for the
study was determined by the beginning date for
data in the I/B/E/S Detail History File, 1983. The
intersection of the three datasets (I/B/E/S, CRSP,
and Compustat) resulted in a sample of 35,719
company-year observations.
Empirical Results
We begin with a description of our findings con-
cerning the relationship between investor disagree-
ment and the value premium and between investor
disagreement and the size premium. We then report
the results of robustness tests of these findings. 
Dispersion of Forecasts and Equity Risk.
To examine whether the value premium is a mani-
festation of investor disagreement, we used the
dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts (DISP) to
capture investors’ divergence of opinion about the
future prospects of companies. DISP was calculated
as the standard deviation of the one-year-ahead
earnings forecast identified as being current (i.e.,
nonstale) as of June each year, standardized by the
stock price per share at the beginning of the year.10
In the context of our analysis, if investors have
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greater difficulty assessing the probability distribu-
tion of future payoffs of value stocks than growth
stocks, value stocks should be subject to greater
earnings forecast dispersion than growth stocks.11 
Table 1 provides the answer to whether the
median values of analysts’ forecast dispersion
change with portfolios sorted on BV/MV and size.
The table reports the mean and median values of
dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts for portfo-
lios formed after classifying stocks into 1 of 25 port-
folios on the basis of the stocks’ BV/MV and size
quintiles. The mean value of forecast dispersion
among analysts is highest (0.0326) for the highest-
BV/MV–smallest-size portfolio; the corresponding
mean for the lowest-BV/MV–biggest-size portfolio
is the lowest (0.0024). Consistent with the view that
small-capitalization and high-BV/MV stocks are
subject to more heterogeneous beliefs among inves-
tors than large-cap and low-BV/MV stocks, disper-
sion in analysts’ earnings forecasts decreases as size
increases and tends to increase as BV/MV increases. 
Tests of the mean and median differences for
the extreme portfolios (Quintiles 1 and 5) sorted on
BV/MV and size show significantly higher inves-
tor disagreement, measured by the dispersion of
analysts’ forecasts, to be present in high-BV/MV
and small-cap stocks. These findings suggest that
the value and small-cap return patterns that have
been observed in the U.S. market may be associated
with an investor disagreement premium that is not
accounted for in conventional CAPMs.
Table 2 provides the mean and median values
of DISP for portfolios formed after sorting company-
year observations independently on BV/MV, size,
and number of analysts following the stock (NAF).
This test was carried out to ensure that the results
reported in Table 1 were not driven by the extent of
analyst coverage. High-BV/MV portfolios display
significantly larger dispersion than low-BV/MV
portfolios even after controlling for the size and
analyst coverage effects. 
Overall, the evidence is strongly in favor of the
view that investors perceive small-cap and high-
BV/MV stocks to be exposed to greater disagree-
ment among analysts than large-cap and low-BV/
MV stocks. Because small-cap and value stocks are
often associated with higher returns, our findings
also suggest that disagreement about a stock’s
future prospects is of concern to investors. This
concept is addressed in the next section by an exam-
ination of whether investor disagreement enters
the return-generating process.  
Table 1. Dispersion of Analyst Forecasts for Portfolios of Companies Sorted Independently on Size 




Q1 (small) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 (big) All Companies Q5 – Q1
Q1 (low) 0.0125 0.0059 0.0049 0.0037 0.0024 0.0055  –0.0101**
[0.0042] [0.0026] [0.0019] [0.0017] [0.0012] [0.0019]  [–0.0030]**
Q2 0.0115 0.0073 0.0059 0.0054 0.0044 0.0069  –0.0071**
[0.0048] [0.0034] [0.0031] [0.0026] [0.0026] [0.0031]  [–0.0022]**
Q3 0.0137 0.0100 0.0071 0.0072 0.0060 0.0088  –0.0077**
[0.0051] [0.0044] [0.0038] [0.0036] [0.0040] [0.0041]  [–0.0011]**
Q4 0.0180 0.0101 0.0076 0.0081 0.0077 0.0104  –0.0103**
[0.0065] [0.0048] [0.0043] [0.0045] [0.0046] [0.0048]  [–0.0019]**
Q5 (high) 0.0326 0.0212 0.0184 0.0150 0.0092 0.0219  –0.0234**
[0.0097] [0.0087] [0.0081] [0.0071] [0.0052] [0.0080]  [–0.0045]**
All companies 0.0178 0.0097 0.0073 0.0067 0.0049 0.0093  –0.0129**
[0.0057] [0.0039] [0.0032] [0.0029] [0.0025] [0.0034]  [–0.0032]**
Q5 – Q1  0.0201**  0.0153**  0.0135**  0.0113**  0.0068**  0.0164**
 [0.0055]**  [0.0061]**  [0.0062]**  [0.0054]**  [0.0040]**  [0.0061]**
Note: The last column and bottom rows report mean (median) differences between extreme portfolios and their significance levels from
the corresponding t-statistics and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests.
*Significant at the 5 percent level.
**Significant at the 1 percent level.
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Robustness Tests. The previous results indi-
cate that investors’ return expectations are likely to
be influenced by investor disagreement about
future growth in the stocks’ earnings. This likeli-
hood raises the question of whether the demand for
risky (especially out-of-favor) assets is sensitive to
investors’ concerns about the unpredictable nature
of future earnings prospects. That is, does investor
disagreement have a distinct and pervasive influ-
ence on the determination of asset returns? If asset
prices are systematically influenced by investor dis-
agreement (manifested in analysts’ divergence of
opinion), a disagreement risk factor (DRF) should
have an effect on the cross-section of stock returns. 
To examine the robustness of our previous find-
ings, we explored whether investor disagreement,
in the form of DRF, is priced in an explicit asset-
pricing model. Fama and French (1993) suggested
that a three-factor model may explain the cross-
section of stock returns. Their three factors are the
excess return (in excess of the risk-free rate) of the
value-weighted market portfolio (RMF), the return
on an arbitrage (zero-investment) portfolio consist-
ing of the return on the big-company portfolio sub-
tracted from the return on the small-company
portfolio (SMB),12 and the return on an arbitrage
portfolio consisting of the return on the portfolio of
high-BV/MV stocks minus the return on the portfo-
lio of low-BV/MV stocks (HML).13 To these three
factors, Carhart (1997) proposed adding a momen-
tum factor (MOM) that captures the difference in
returns of value-weighted portfolios of companies
with high and low prior momentum.
To test whether returns are sensitive to inves-
tors’ disagreement about the payoffs of stocks, as
reflected in analysts’ diverse forecasts, we con-
structed an asset-pricing model for portfolios based
on the Fama and French (1993) three factors, the
momentum factor, and the disagreement risk fac-
tor.14 To construct DRF, we ranked company-year
observations by DISP and formed two equal-
weighted return portfolios based on the top 30 per-
cent and bottom 30 percent DISP rankings. Monthly
returns were computed for these portfolios for the
next 12 months. This process was repeated annually
and led to the construction of return series of 210
monthly observations for the top 30 percent and for
the bottom 30 percent portfolios from July 1983
through December 2001. The variable DRF is the
return difference between the top 30 percent and
bottom 30 percent portfolio returns. This metric of
risk is an expectational risk measure and does not
rely on assumptions about the stability of risk, as do
most other methods of deriving risk proxies. 
We tested the null hypothesis that DRF is not
priced in the stock market (i.e., will have a zero
value) against the alternative hypothesis that it is
priced. Defining all returns to be nominal, we
obtained factor sensitivities b, s, h, m, and d from
regressing excess monthly portfolio returns on the
following multifactor model (Model 1):
R(t) – Rf (t) = a + bRMF(t) + sSMB(t) 
+ hHML(t) + mMOM(t) 
+ dDRF(t) + e(t), (1)
Table 2. Dispersion of Analyst Forecasts for Portfolios of Companies Sorted Independently on Size, 
BV/MV, and Analyst Following, 1983–2001 Data
(medians in brackets)




















Low 0.0110 0.0085 0.0119 0.0044 0.0048 0.0059 0.0025 0.0031 0.0032
[0.0032] [0.0038] [0.0037] [0.0013] [0.0021] [0.0029] [0.0008] [0.0012] [0.0017]
Medium 0.0139 0.0125 0.0131 0.0054 0.0069 0.0096 0.0027 0.0044 0.0068
[0.0041] [0.0053] [0.0071] [0.0020] [0.0036] [0.0059] [0.0011] [0.0025] [0.0042]
High 0.0241 0.0266 0.0281 0.0083 0.0134 0.0200 0.0058 0.0064 0.0115
[0.0065] [0.0096] [0.0120] [0.0032] [0.0057] [0.0102] [0.0014] [0.0030] [0.0067]
All companies 0.0159 0.0146 0.0175 0.0055 0.0071 0.0101 0.0032 0.0041 0.0060
[0.0043] [0.0054] [0.0074] [0.0019] [0.0031] [0.0049] [0.0010] [0.0019] [0.0031]
High – Low 0.0131**  0.0181** 0.0162** 0.0039** 0.0086** 0.0141** 0.0033* 0.0033** 0.0083**
[0.0033]**  [0.0058]** [0.0083]** [0.0019]** [0.0036]** [0.0073]** [0.0006]* [0.0018]** [0.0050]**
Note: NAF (number of analysts following) is the number of forecasts used to estimate DISP. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level.
**Significant at the 1 percent level.
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where
R(t) = return of the portfolio 
Rf(t) = risk-free return (return on the one-
month T-bill) 
RMF(t) = excess return of the value-weighted
market portfolio
SMB(t) = return of the small minus big port-
folio
HML(t) = return of the high-BV/MV (value)
minus low-BV/MV (growth) port-
folio
MOM(t) = momentum
DRF(t) = disagreement risk factor
e = error term 
—all at time t. The slope coefficients (factor load-
ings) determine investors’ expected risk premiums
for bearing a stock’s exposure to these sources of
risk. If disagreement is of concern to investors, then
DRF should be priced (i.e., command a premium).
As a result, the coefficient on the disagreement
factor, d, should have explanatory power for the co-
movement in stock returns. In line with our previ-
ous findings, if the future growth prospects of value
and small-cap stocks are perceived by investors to
be more difficult to predict than those of growth
and large-cap stocks, the coefficient on DRF should
be substantially more significant for the returns to
the value and small-cap stock portfolio. That is,
disagreement arising from the difficulty of assess-
ing the probability distribution of future payoffs of
value stocks should influence investors’ confidence
and, therefore, raise their reward–risk expectations.
Because this effect assumes that risk-averse inves-
tors are also averse to disagreement, we expected
our tests to shed light on whether divergence of
opinion is relevant to asset pricing. Note here that
conventional asset-pricing models, such as the
CAPM, ignore the importance of disagreement
risk, on the premise that it either does not matter or
does not exist (i.e., the CAPM assumes homoge-
nous expectations).
To ensure that our results would not be driven
by a particular asset-pricing specification, we also
considered an alternative return-generating model.
We checked the robustness of our previous results
by estimating a Ferguson and Shockley (2003)
model but adding the MOM factor and DRF. As in
Model 1, we tested the hypothesis in Model 2 that
DRF is not priced against the alternative hypothesis
that it is priced. Defining all returns in nominal
terms, we obtained factor sensitivities b, bD/E, bZ,
m, and d from regressing excess monthly portfolio
returns on the following multifactor model:
R(t) – Rf(t) = a + bRMF(t) + bD/ER
D/E(t) 
+ bZR
Z(t) + mMOM(t) 
+ dDRF(t) + e(t), (2)
where 
RD/E = leverage—that is, the simple average
return of the two portfolios containing
stocks with high debt-to-equity ratios
minus the simple average return of the
two low-D/E portfolios
RZ = distress—that is, the simple average
return on the three high-Z portfolios
(where Z stands for Altman’s Z-score,
a measure of the likelihood of financial
distress) minus the simple average re-
turn on the three low-Z portfolios
The leverage and distress factors were constructed
in the same way Fama and French (1993) created
the SMB and HML factors.15 
To the extent that Model 2 (the Ferguson–
Shockley model) represents a superior way (to that
of Model 1) of controlling for financial distress, it can
be viewed as a more strenuous test for the uncer-
tainty factor. If our tests produce evidence in sup-
port of DRF, a reasonable conclusion is that investor
disagreement is important in explaining the average
return of common stocks in the cross-section.
For regressions run on Model 1, we formed the
25 size and BV/MV portfolios as the overlaps of
stocks belonging to independently sorted size and
BV/MV quintiles. Excess returns of these portfolios
were regressed on RMF, SMB, HML, MOM, and
DRF. The empirical results (not reported here)
were, in general, consistent with the evidence of
Fama and French (1993).16 The intercepts were sta-
tistically significant in 6 of the 25 portfolios at the 5
percent (7 at the 10 percent) level of significance. 
To determine whether Model 1 adequately
explains stock returns, we used seemingly unrelated
regression (SUR) procedures to test the hypothesis
that the intercepts are jointly equal to zero for all 25
portfolios. Although the χ2-test result indicated that
the null hypothesis (that the regression intercept
coefficients are jointly equal to zero) was rejected at
the 1 percent level, the high R2 values indicated that
the model that included DRF explained a large frac-
tion of the variability in stock returns. The coeffi-
cients on DRF, in agreement with the results from
Table 1 and the prediction of the asset-pricing model
of Williams (1977), showed a consistent positive
relationship between disagreement risk and the
returns of the portfolios in the highest BV/MV quin-
tile and smallest size quintiles. The coefficients on
DRF for the largest size quintile and lowest BV/MV
quintile were mostly negative and significant. 
Moreover, in every size quintile, the slopes on
DRF were higher for the value stocks than for the
growth stocks. In other words, we found a strong
association between disagreement risk and returns
Financial Analysts Journal
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to the extreme value portfolio even after we con-
trolled for size effects. The results also demonstrate
that a strong positive relationship exists between
the smallest-cap stock returns and investor dis-
agreement after we controlled for the BV/MV
effect. In every BV/MV quintile, the slopes on DRF
were highest for the smallest size quintiles.
Adding DRF to the three-factor model had an
interesting effect on the slope of the market
factor, RMF. The coefficient on RMF remained
close to 1.0, which implies that the returns of the
different portfolios are not distinctly exposed to
overall market movements when the other four
factors are included. This result suggests that a
considerable part of the variation in average
stock returns is explained by the SMB, HML,
MOM, and DRF factors. 
The systematic relationship of excess portfolio
returns and DRF is consistent with earlier studies
showing that investors do not systematically
ignore analysts’ forecasts. The loadings on DRF for
the two extreme (highest-BV/MV and smallest-
cap) portfolios confirm that the value and small-
cap stock excess returns command a disagreement
premium as well as size and distress risk premi-
ums. The negative coefficient on DRF for the large-
cap–low-BV/MV portfolio indicates that growth
and large-cap stocks are not perceived by investors
as being subject to the same degree of investor
disagreement as are value and small-cap stocks. 
Finally, the adjusted R2 values range between
0.80 and 0.95, indicating that the five-factor Model
1 captures most of the variation in average port-
folio returns.
We also ran time-series regressions in which
Model 2 was used for the 25 portfolio returns. This
five-factor model included RMF, RD/E, and RZ (as
in Ferguson and Shockley) plus MOM and DRF.
The regression results for the leverage and distress
factors (not reported here) were in agreement with
the findings of Ferguson and Shockley.17 Consis-
tent with the evidence found for the Model 1 regres-
sions, DRF had the expected sign and was mostly
(in 22 out of 25 regressions) statistically significant.
The intercepts were significant in 11 of 25 regres-
sions, and the χ2-test result indicated that the null
hypothesis (that the regression intercept coeffi-
cients are jointly equal to zero) was rejected at the
1 percent level, as was the case for Model 1. 
Overall, these results are in harmony with our
prior evidence indicating that DRF plays an impor-
tant role in explaining average stock returns. The
results thus suggest that the explanatory power of
DRF is not limited to a specific asset-pricing model.
Notwithstanding the differences between the
Fama–French and the Ferguson–Shockley return-
generating specifications, this supplemental evi-
dence supports the view that the investor disagree-
ment factor plays an important role in explaining
the returns of value and growth stocks.
Table 3 presents the results of time-series
regressions from the use of Model 1 of monthly
equal-weighted portfolio returns for the subsam-
ples of high-BV/MV, low-BV/MV, small, and big
companies. The regressions were run first without
the disagreement risk factor. We also report regres-
sion results for the value-minus-growth and small-
minus-big arbitrage portfolios. 
The coefficients on DRF in Table 3 show that
there is a positive relationship between the returns
of value stocks and investor disagreement risk. The
coefficient on DRF for the value portfolio (Panel A)
is 0.368 (with a t-value of 7.82), indicating that
disagreement covaries with high-BV/MV portfolio
returns. These results are consistent with our pre-
vious findings and provide additional evidence in
support of the view that value stocks command a
premium because investors hold more diverse
beliefs about their future growth prospects. 
The results in Panel C demonstrate that a pos-
itive and similar relationship exists between small-
cap stock returns and the disagreement risk factor. 
As previously, the coefficient on the market risk
factor is close to 1.0 for all the regressions, which
suggests that the SMB, HML, MOM, and DRF fac-
tors explain a large portion of the variation in aver-
age stock returns. The adjusted R2 values for the
model with DRF included range from 0.8890 to
0.9684, significantly higher than those of the four-
factor version (not including DRF) of Model 1. This
result indicates that (1) DRF adds significant explan-
atory power and (2) this five-factor model explains
most of the variation in average portfolio returns.
The regression results based on the arbitrage
portfolio returns provide interesting insights into
the importance of DRF. The returns of the value-
minus-growth (Panel E) and the small-minus-big
(Panel F) arbitrage portfolios are positively and
significantly associated with the divergence of
opinion among investors about future growth in
earnings. Furthermore, the R2 values for the arbi-
trage portfolio regressions are greatly improved by
the addition of DRF in the model.
Table 4 repeats the tests presented in Table 3
but with the Ferguson–Shockley RD/E and RZ fac-
tors instead of the Fama–French HML and SMB
factors. The coefficient on DRF in Table 4 for the
value portfolio (Panel A) is 0.581 (with a t-value of
13.26), confirming that disagreement covaries with
high-BV/MV portfolio returns. Other results are
also similar to those presented in Table 3; thus, the
explanatory power of DRF is not affected by the
choice of asset-pricing model.  
Divergent Opinions and the Performance of Value Stocks
November/December 2004 www.cfapubs.org 61
Table 3. Model 1 Results: High-BV/MV, Low-BV/MV, Small, and Big 
Subsamples
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Subsample a bRMF sSMB hHML mMOM dDRF Adjusted R2
A. High-BV/MV companies
0.003 1.113  0.804  0.716 –0.257 0.9098
(2.25)  (39.12)  (21.54)  (16.95) (–9.95)
0.003 1.068  0.603  0.584 –0.202 0.368 0.9294
(3.06)  (41.36)  (14.45)  (14.23) (–8.45) (7.82)
B. Low-BV/MV companies
0.002 1.106  0.574  –0.480 –0.326 0.9549
(1.84)  (41.43)  (16.40)  (–12.11) (–13.46)
0.002 1.118  0.624  –0.447 –0.339 –0.092 0.9554
(1.81)  (41.02)  (14.17)  (–10.32) (–13.48) (–1.86)
C. Small companies
0.004 1.043  1.204  0.149 –0.421 0.8574
(2.02)  (21.84)  (19.21)  (2.11) (–9.73)
0.004 0.967  0.865  –0.075 –0.328 0.624 0.8890
(2.47)  (22.34)  (12.36)  (1.08) (–8.21) (7.90)
D. Big companies
 0.001 1.074  –0.091  0.068 –0.162 0.9667
(2.29)  (68.13)  (–4.38)  (2.88) (–11.32)
0.001 1.087  –0.036  0.104 –0.177 –0.100 0.9684
(2.27)  (68.87)  (–1.42)  (4.13) (–12.13) (–3.49)
E. Value minus growth
0.001 0.007  0.229  1.196 0.069 0.8455
(0.83) (0.24)  (6.19)  (28.52) (2.70)
0.001  –0.049  –0.021  1.031 0.137 0.461 0.8994
(1.27)  (–2.13)  (–0.55)  (27.47) (6.37) (10.80)
F. Small minus big
0.002  –0.031  1.294  0.082 –0.260 0.6885
(1.22)  (–0.61)  (19.83)  (1.11) (–5.76)
0.003  –0.120  0.901  –0.178 –0.152 0.724 0.7746
(1.63)  (–2.76)  (12.83)  (–2.58) (–3.78) (9.14)
Notes: Model for subsamples A, B, C, and D: Ri – Rf = ai + biRMF + siSMB + miMOM +diDRF. The left-
hand column return is the equal-weighted return in excess of the risk-free rate for the extreme-quintile
portfolio. In the fifth and sixth pairs of regressions (Panels E and F), the dependent variables are,
respectively, the difference between the high-BV/MV and the low-BV/MV equal-weighted portfolio
returns and the difference between the small and big equal-weighted portfolio returns.
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Table 4. Model 2 Results: High-BV/MV, Low-BV/MV, Small, and Big 
Subsamples
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Subsample a bRMF bD/ERD/E bZRZ mMOM dDRF Adjusted R2
A. High-BV/MV companies
0.001 1.009  0.509  –0.122  –0.077 0.8188
(1.00)  (27.28)  (9.93)  (–1.55)  (–1.82)
0.002 0.959  0.405  –0.094  –0.065 0.581 0.9027
(2.12)  (34.98)  (10.42)  (–1.62)  (–2.11)  (13.26)
B. Low-BV/MV companies
–0.006 1.180  –0.218  0.696 0.000 0.8474
(–3.62)  (26.46)  (–3.50)  (7.30) (0.00)
–0.006 1.158  –0.265  0.708 0.005 0.260 0.8564
(–3.52)  (26.52)  (–4.28)  (7.65) (0.10) (3.73)
C. Small companies
–0.004 1.027  0.061  0.633  –0.046 0.6489
(–1.84)  (15.42)  (0.66)  (4.45)  (–0.60)
–0.003 0.940  –0.123  0.683  –0.026 1.026 0.8041
(–1.72)  (18.70)  (–1.73)  (6.41)  (–0.45)  (12.78)
D. Big companies
0.002 1.060  0.129  –0.126  –0.136 0.9614
(2.46)  (66.71)  (5.78)  (–3.70)  (–7.56)
0.001 1.076  0.162  –0.135  –0.140  –0.187 0.9713
(2.36)  (77.78)  (8.28)  (–4.59)  (–8.99)  (–8.46)
E. Value minus growth
0.008  –0.171  0.728  –0.818  –0.077 0.5706
(4.54)  (–3.91)  (11.87)  (–8.75)  (–1.54)
0.008  –0.198  0.670  –0.802  –0.070 0.321 0.6121
(5.04)  (–4.73)  (11.26)  (–9.02)  (–1.48) (4.79)
F. Small minus big
–0.006  –0.032  –0.067  0.759 0.091 0.1074
(–2.13)  (–0.43)  (–0.64)  (4.69) (1.05)
–0.005  –0.136  –0.285  0.818 0.114 1.212 0.5355
(–2.16)  (–2.47)  (–3.66)  (7.00) (1.84)  (13.78)
Notes: Model for subsamples A, B, C, and D: Ri – Rf = ai + biRMF + bD/E,iRD/E + bZ,iRZ + miMOM + diDRF.
The left-hand column return is the equal-weighted return in excess of the risk-free rate for the extreme-
quintile portfolio. In the fifth and sixth pairs of regressions (Panels E and F), the dependent variables are,
respectively, the difference between the high-BV/MV and the low-BV/MV equal-weighted portfolio
returns and the difference between the small and big equal-weighted portfolio returns.
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We conclude that value investment strategies
yield higher returns because value stocks are risk-
ier, in the sense that investor disagreement about
their future growth in earnings is greater than it is
about growth stocks. The greater disagreement
about the future payoffs of value stocks can be
attributed to the limited and lower quality of infor-
mation available about the stocks to investors.
Conclusions
We investigated whether divergence of opinion
among investors plays an important role in asset
pricing. Specifically, we tested whether differ-
ences in opinion among investors (manifested in
the divergence of analysts’ earnings forecasts) can
explain the cross-sectional return difference
between value and growth stocks in the U.S. mar-
ket over the 1983–2001 period.
We found dispersion in analysts’ earnings
forecasts to be considerably higher for high-BV/
MV (value) than for low-BV/MV (growth) portfo-
lios, which indicates that the cash flows of growth
stocks are perceived by investors as less uncertain
and, therefore, less risky than the cash flows of
value stocks. Similar results were obtained when
we compared quintile portfolios sorted on extreme
size: Small companies exhibited greater forecast
dispersion than large companies.
Our findings suggest that the return advantage
of value strategies reflects, at least in part, compen-
sation for bearing risk associated with higher disper-
sion in analysts’ earnings forecasts, which confirms
the conjecture of Williams (1977) that dispersion of
opinion represents risk. Hence, the superior return
of value stocks should be viewed as a reward for the
greater investor disagreement about the stocks’
future growth in earnings. 
Finally, our tests show that the explanatory
power of a disagreement risk factor is not limited
to a specific asset-pricing model.
We benefited from discussions with Martin Gruber and
comments from Burton Malkiel. We are grateful to I/B/E/S
International for providing the EPS forecast data.
Notes
1. Lakonishok et al. also argued that value strategies yield
higher returns because the strategies exploit the suboptimal
behavior of the typical investor.
2. Doukas et al. discussed extensively the limitations of the
previous empirical studies.
3. See, for example, Williams (1938), Mayshar (1983), and
Epstein and Wang (1994). In a different context, Kim and
Verrechia (1991), among others, recognized a positive and
direct relationship between dispersion of beliefs and both
trading volume and price volatility. Harris and Raviv (1993)
developed empirical implications about volume, volatility,
and price dynamics arising from investors’ heterogeneous
interpretations of news.
4. Kraus and Smith (1989) argued that even in the absence of
new information, a change in opinions may result in price
changes. Because investors have imperfect information
about one another, changes in opinions generate and rein-
force uncertainty and preserve heterogeneity of beliefs at
equilibrium.
5. This argument is analogous to Knight’s (1921) concept of
uncertainty, in which the investor (owner) does not have
enough information to form a confident assessment of the
probability distribution.
6. This difficulty varies among investors; therefore, their
beliefs about the future outcomes of an investment are
widely dispersed.
7. Venture capital is a good example. A common practice
among venture capitalists is to require rates of return of 50
percent or higher to invest in a project.
8. Williams (1938) argued that heterogeneity of investors
gives rise to higher returns because the key issue for inves-
tors is not how much to invest but which asset to invest in.
That is, the market price of equity is determined by the
marginal, not the average, investor opinion. Williams
implicitly assumed that short selling is not feasible.
9. The use of the Detail History I/B/E/S data allowed us to
overcome the issue of stale forecasts raised in Diether,
Malloy, and Scherbina (2002).
10. The logic of Berk’s (1995, 1997) criticism on company size
as a risk factor can apply also to our disagreement factor.
Therefore, we examined the sensitivity of our results by
scaling DISP by four alternative deflators: sales, book value
of total assets, absolute value of EPS, and absolute value of
the median forecast. Moreover, we examined the unad-
justed dispersion of analysts’ forecasts for portfolios of all
stocks traded on the NYSE, Amex, NASDAQ, and regional
exchanges. We also repeated the tests with each year of the
full period as the sample period to examine whether our
results are sensitive to calendar time. Based on these find-
ings, we conclude that our results are insensitive to the
choice of the scaling variable, the specific year, or the market
conditions. The results based on alternative deflators are
available on request.
11. Malkiel (1982) also elaborated on the usefulness of and
rationale for divergence of opinion among security analysts
as an ex ante measure of risk and showed that divergence
has a closer empirical relationship to expected return than
do beta and other measures of risk. In addition, Harris
(1986) found a positive relationship between risk premiums
and dispersion in analysts’ forecasts for the stocks in the
S&P 500 Index and a set of 150 regulated companies’ stocks
in the 1982–84 period. Olsen and Troughton (2000) showed
that professional money managers regard analysts’ dis-
agreement as a more important risk metric than conven-
tional measures of risk, such as beta or standard deviation.
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12. Following Fama and French (1993, 1996), we determined
the breakpoints for small-cap and big-cap companies by
allocating NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ stocks into one of
two groups based on whether their June (of each year)
market equity value was below (small) or above (big) the
median of market equity value for NYSE stocks.
13. In our study, as in Fama and French (1996), the high-BV/
MV portfolio consisted of the top 30 percent of all compa-
nies in Compustat; the low-BV/MV portfolio contained the
bottom 30 percent.
14. In the regressions, MOM is the UMD (up minus down) factor
from Kenneth French’s website (mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/
pages/faculty/ken.french/), computed as the average
return on the two high-prior-return portfolios minus the
average return on the two low-prior-return portfolios.
15. See Ferguson and Shockley for a detailed description of the
construction of the leverage and distress factors. The time
series of the leverage and distress factors were provided by
Ferguson and Shockley and cover the period July 1983
through December 2000.
16. Tabulated results are available together with this article at
www.cfapubs.org/faj/issues/v60n6/toc.html. 
17. Tabulated results are available together with this article at
www.cfapubs.org/faj/issues/v60n6/toc.html.
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The empirical results for regressions of the 25 size–BV/MV portfolios on RMF, SMB, HML,
MOM, and DRF are given in Table X, and the results for the regressions of the portfolios
on RMF, RD/E, RZ, MOM, and DRF are provided in Table Y.  
Table X. Model 1 Results: Full Sample




Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High
Coefficient t-Statistic
a t(a)
Small  0.004  0.005  0.005  0.003  0.006  1.49  2.30  2.57  1.46  3.06
2  0.001  0.002  0.003  0.001  0.000  0.68  1.46  2.30  1.03  0.18
3  0.002  –0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  1.75  –0.11  0.09  1.24  1.03
4  0.004  –0.001  –0.001  –0.001  0.001  3.19  –0.62  –0.57  –0.61  1.03
Big  0.004  –0.000  –0.000  –0.002  0.000  4.29  –0.26  –0.05  –1.57  0.13
b t(b)
Small  0.968  1.005  0.928  0.937  0.953  13.44  17.53  17.35  18.78  18.84
2  1.149  1.140  1.091  1.108  1.206  26.92  30.19  33.76  34.76  32.98
3  1.157  1.182  1.118  1.121  1.167  31.71  32.74  34.70  36.80  31.02
4  1.108  1.202  1.199  1.127  1.117  33.16  33.88  35.47  37.36  30.89
Big  1.056  1.155  1.135  1.069  1.051  46.79  38.66  36.81  36.51  31.77
h t(h)
Small  –0.865  –0.394  0.118  0.301  0.323  –7.56  –4.33  3.80  2.96  4.02
2  –0.513  0.103  0.394  0.663  0.703  –7.57  1.72  13.09  4.72  12.10
3  –0.444  0.324  0.621  0.801  0.765  –7.66  12.14  16.53  8.72  12.81
4  –0.444  0.458  0.678  0.719  0.733  –8.36  12.63  14.99  7.58  12.75
Big  –0.371  0.343  0.505  0.731  0.814  –10.34  10.31  15.71  7.70  15.48
s t(s)
Small  0.844  0.884  0.986  0.810  0.803  7.25  9.54  11.39  10.01  9.81
2  0.986  0.930  0.850  0.891  0.778  14.28  15.25  16.27  17.28  13.14
3  0.917  0.763  0.722  0.712  0.625  15.55  13.07  13.86  14.45  10.27
4  0.485  0.355  0.356  0.290  0.275  8.97  6.19  6.52  5.94  4.70
Big  –0.053  –0.035  –0.023  0.038  –0.001  –1.45  –0.72  –0.47  0.81  –0.02
m t(m)
Small  –0.528  –0.335  –0.300  –0.179  –0.260  –7.93  –6.33  –6.07  –3.88  –5.57
2  –0.350  –0.241  –0.164  –0.198  –0.217  –8.87  –6.91  –5.49  –6.72  –6.41
3  –0.402  –0.210  –0.223  –0.196  –0.240  –11.93  –6.29  –7.50  –6.94  –6.90
4  –0.318  –0.192  –0.200  –0.122  –0.184  –10.30  –5.84  –6.40  –4.37  –5.51
Big  –0.204  –0.118  –0.089  –0.141  –0.089  –9.77  –4.26  –3.11  –5.22  –1.37
d t(d)
Small  0.790  0.620  0.436  0.502  0.849  6.02  5.93  4.47  5.52  9.20
2  –0.024  0.046  0.014  –0.062  0.231  –0.31  0.68  0.24  –1.07  3.47
3  –0.185  –0.167  –0.222  –0.242  0.035  –2.77  –2.53  –3.78  –4.35  0.51
4  –0.271  –0.234  –0.188  –0.232  –0.056  –4.45  –3.61  –3.05  –4.21  –0.86
Big  –0.158  –0.072  –0.103  –0.132  –0.089  –3.83  –1.32  –1.83  –2.47  –1.48
R2 Standard Error
Small 0.83 0.85 0.82 0.80 0.83  3.88  3.09  2.88  2.69  2.72
2 0.92 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.89  2.30  2.03  1.74  1.72  1.97
3 0.93 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.86  1.97  1.95  1.74  1.64  2.03
4 0.93 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.83  1.80  1.91  1.82  1.63  1.95
Big 0.95 0.89 0.87 0.87 0.83  1.22  1.61  1.66  1.58  1.78
Note: Asset-pricing test: χ2-test of the joint hypothesis that the regression intercepts for the set of 25 portfolios are all simultaneously
equal to zero when SUR estimation procedures are used. Results: χ2-statistic = 79.61; p-value = 0.000. 
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Table Y. Model 2 Results: Full Sample 




Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High
Coefficient t-Statistic
a t(a)
Small  –0.012  –0.004  –0.001  –0.000  0.002  –4.07  –1.47  –0.58  –0.12  0.90
2  –0.010  –0.004  0.001  0.000  0.000  –3.71  –2.02  0.38  0.31  0.15
3  –0.007  –0.002  0.000  0.003  0.002  –3.05  –1.13  0.00  2.49  1.56
4  –0.003  –0.000  0.002  0.002  0.004  –1.91  –0.10  1.60  1.71  3.52
Big  0.000  0.001  0.003  0.003  0.005  0.19  1.26  2.64  2.83  3.47
b t(b)
Small  1.040  1.013  0.876  0.855  0.859  14.09  15.10  14.70  15.96  16.79
2  1.202  1.128  1.030  1.000  1.059  18.58  23.48  24.92  25.16  25.25
3  1.207  1.111  1.005  0.992  1.041  20.42  26.85  28.65  29.78  26.23
4  1.158  1.152  1.109  1.038  1.017  26.35  34.42  35.27  38.15  32.53
Big  1.078  1.138  1.113  0.976  0.973  50.47  42.26  38.02  35.41  27.47
bD/E t(bD/E)
Small  –0.520  –0.441  0.009  0.120  0.166  –4.89  –4.64  0.11  1.59  2.30
2  –0.357  0.072  0.247  0.387  0.391  –3.89  1.06  4.22  6.87  6.58
3  –0.267  0.191  0.412  0.523  0.527  –3.18  3.25  8.30  11.07  9.37
4  –0.208  0.329  0.435  0.542  0.600  –3.34  6.94  9.76  14.06  13.54
Big  –0.172  0.302  0.369  0.556  0.639  –5.69  7.92  8.89  14.23  12.72
bZ t(bZ)
Small  1.108  0.871  0.677  0.483  0.366  6.89  6.13  5.36  4.25  3.38
2  0.968  0.465  0.205  0.002  0.026  7.07  4.57  2.34  0.02  0.30
3  0.791  0.326  0.020  –0.222  –0.232  6.31  0.27  13.86  –3.16  –2.76
4  0.516  –0.104  –0.228  –0.481  –0.545  5.55  –3.42  6.52  –8.34  –8.23
Big  0.348  –0.174  –0.408  –0.561  –0.778  7.70  –3.04  –6.58  –9.61  –10.36
m t(m)
Small  0.104  0.030  –0.034  –0.031  –0.046  1.25  0.40  –0.51  –0.51  –0.80
2  0.099  0.048  –0.008  –0.086  –0.116  1.36  0.88  –0.17  –1.92  –2.46
3  0.045  –0.062  –0.114  –0.223  –0.145  0.67  –1.34  –2.88  –3.16  –3.24
4  0.044  –0.203  –0.254  –0.120  –0.151  0.90  –5.37  –7.18  –3.91  –4.30
Big  –0.059  –0.212  –0.256  –0.251  –0.153  –2.43  –7.00  –7.76  –8.09  –3.84
d t(d)
Small  1.153  1.091  0.883  0.918  1.168  9.79  10.19  9.28  10.73  14.29
2  0.493  0.504  0.440  0.374  0.613  4.77  6.58  6.66  5.89  9.16
3  0.328  0.251  0.110  0.127  0.285  3.47  3.80  1.97  2.39  4.50
4  0.020  –0.131  –0.015  –0.142  –0.069  0.29  –2.45  –0.31  –3.28  –1.39
Big  –0.226  –0.238  –0.250  –0.240  –0.227  –6.62  –5.54  –5.35  –5.45  –4.02
R2 Standard Error
Small 0.73 0.74 0.72 0.74 0.78  4.08  3.71  3.30  2.96  2.83
2 0.77 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.83  3.58  2.66  2.29  2.20  2.32
3 0.79 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.81  3.27  2.29  1.94  1.84  2.20
4 0.84 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.85  2.43  1.85  1.74  1.51  1.73
Big 0.95 0.91 0.88 0.87 0.79  1.18  1.49  1.62  1.53  1.96
Note: Asset-pricing test: χ2-test of the joint hypothesis that the regression intercepts for the set of 25 portfolios are all simultaneously
equal to zero when SUR estimation procedures are used. Results: χ2-statistic = 89.54; p-value = 0.000.
